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639 
NOTE 
PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT PLAINTIFFS: THE 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
AND RECOVERY OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS  
ACT OF 1991 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The woman in the sexual harassment suit should be a virgin who 
attended church every Sunday, only ten thousand miles on her back 
and forth to the pew. Her immaculate house is bleached with chlorine 
tears. The woman in the sexual harassment suit should never have 
known a man other than her father who kissed her only on the cheek, 
and the minister who patted her head with his gloves on. The woman 
in the sexual harassment suit is visited by female angels only, has a 
platinum hymen protected by Brinks, is white of course as unpainted 
plaster, naturally blonde and speaks only English. The woman in the 
sexual harassment suit wears white cotton blouses buttoned to the 
throat, small pearl clip-on earrings, grey or blue suits and one inch 
heels with nylons. Her nails and lips are pink. If you are other than we 
have described above, please do not bother to complain. You are not a 
lady. We cannot help you. A woman like you simply cannot be 
harassed.1 
The American legal system subjects women2 who bring sexual 
harassment actions against the creators of their hostile work environments to 
harsh invasion and assault upon their private selves. The psychological and 
physical effects of sexual harassment can disable women. Victims of 
harassment often suffer from depression, nervousness, hysteria, insomnia, 
 
 
 1. Marge Piercy, The grey flannel sexual harassment suit, in WHAT ARE BIG GIRLS MADE OF? 
41-42 (1997). 
 2. This Note refers to sexual harassment plaintiffs generically as women because the majority of 
sexual harassment plaintiffs are women who allege sexual harassment by men. Mary F. Radford, By 
Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 521 
(1994). However, it is important to note that men may also be subject to workplace sexual harassment. 
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weight changes, fatigue, nausea, and emotional breakdowns.3 In addition, 
bringing suit exposes women to intense examinations of their past sexual 
history, their personal life, and their mental stability.4 To tear further into the 
lives of sexual harassment victims, defendants will often request disclosure 
of plaintiffs’ mental health records.5 
The Supreme Court established the psychotherapist-patient privilege to 
protect against the undue invasion into therapy relationships built upon 
confidentiality and trust.6 Although the Supreme Court created this privilege 
to ensure protection of mental health records, courts have discretion to waive 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege if they deem it necessary to the cause of 
action. Courts, however, remain unclear in their determination of whether a 
claim for emotional distress damages constitutes a waiver of the privilege 
because the plaintiff has placed her mental state at issue.7  
Many federal courts have held that a sexual harassment plaintiff seeking 
compensation for mental distress waives her psychotherapist-patient 
privilege and exposes her mental health records to examination because she 
has placed her mental state at issue in the litigation.8 Whether damages for 
emotional distress serve as a waiver is especially important to sexual 
harassment plaintiffs seeking redress under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.9 
The amended act allows a victim of sexual harassment to recover 
compensatory damages for mental anguish and emotional distress resulting 
from a hostile work environment.10 Although Congress enacted Title VII to 
create redress for civil rights grievances, many courts treat the damages 
provision as an additional tort-based claim, requiring additional evidence of a 
 
 
 3. Patricia Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Experiences of 
92 Women, in 4 WORKING WOMEN’S INSTITUTE RESEARCH SERIES REPORT NO. 3 (1979). See also 
CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER 40 (1976). 
 4. Ann Davis, Ruling May Halt Defense Strategy of Using Plaintiffs’ Pasts in Suit, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 29, 1997, at B5 (quoting a defense attorney asserting that inquiry into a plaintiff’s life history is 
necessary because “the company has the right to see what else has happened in [her] life” when she is 
seeking damages for emotional distress stemming from alleged harassment). 
 5. For a more detailed discussion of judicial determinations concerning a defendant’s request 
for disclosure of a plaintiff’s mental health records, see infra Part III.B. 
 6. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996). For a detailed discussion of the case and its 
creation of a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, see infra Part III.A.  
 7. For a discussion of judicial determinations of claims for emotional distress damages as 
waivers of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see infra Parts III.B.1-2. 
 8. For a description of the rationale of courts that have addressed the damages provision of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 9. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b) (1994). See also H.R. Rep. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 64-65 (1991), 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 49, 602-03 (detailing the rationale for amending the 
damages provisions of Title VII).  
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sexual harassment plaintiff’s emotional distress.11  
No consensus exists for finding waiver of the privilege. Therefore, this 
Note proposes that in cases filed under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts 
considering waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege should carefully 
balance the costs and benefits of opening mental health records to scrutiny. 
In most instances, this balancing test will favor protection of the sexual 
harassment plaintiff over waiver of the privilege. Part II of this Note 
examines the development of the sexual harassment cause of action, 
describing how the law has advanced from not recognizing sexual 
harassment to addressing the universal problem of gender-based 
discrimination. Part II explores the historical development of the federally 
recognized psychotherapist-patient privilege. This part focuses on how courts 
addressing emotional distress claims resulting from employment 
discrimination have resolved the waiver issue. It also notes that although only 
a few courts have addressed emotional distress damages under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 for sexual harassment, there is no clear consensus among 
the courts for finding a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
Part IV discusses provisions in the Federal Rules that, like the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, are designed to protect the sexual 
harassment plaintiff from undue invasion of privacy. This part analyzes both 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3512 and Federal Rule of Evidence 41213 and 
how those Rules protect the sexual harassment plaintiff’s privacy in a Title 
VII action. This analysis is important because it demonstrates why courts 
determining whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be waived 
should follow the guidance of the Federal Rules’ protection of the privacy of 
the sexual harassment plaintiff. Part V enumerates factors that courts should 
consider when determining waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
This part argues that the social policies contained in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, the comparable judicial policies recognizing protection of the sexual 
harassment victim, and the privacy interests of the plaintiffs outweigh the 
probative value of the mental health records to the defendant and the judicial 
fact-finding process. Part V then proposes measures to reconcile the sexual 
harassment plaintiff’s right to privacy with the defendant’s right to address 
sexual harassment claims. 
 
 
 11. For a more complete discussion of the treatment of the damages provision in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 35. 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CAUSE OF ACTION 
Litigation of the sexual harassment claim has developed as a legal cause 
of action over time. Since women entered into the workforce, they have been 
subjected to sexual harassment.14 However, the legal system did not 
recognize sexual harassment as a problem until the late 1970s.15 This part 
will begin by examining the treatment of sexual harassment under the 
common law. It will then follow the establishment of sexual harassment as 
sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 This part 
will conclude with a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the intent 
of the legislature behind its enactment. 
A. Sexual Harassment Claims Under Common Law  
The purpose of tort law is to redress private wrongs.17 Thus, it would 
seem natural to find remedies in tort law18 for the repercussions19 of sexual 
harassment. Prior to the recognition of sexual harassment as actionable sex 
discrimination, common law remedies provided the only compensation for 
sexual harassment victims.20 However, because even today, no common law 
tort specifically remedies discrimination, sexual harassment does not fit into 
a traditional tort category.21 Tort law does not provide sexual harassment 
plaintiffs with backpay, job reinstatement, or injunctive relief against the 
 
 
 14. See KERRY SEGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600 TO 
1993 PASSIM (1994) (documenting sexual harassment of working women prior to the industrial 
revolution). 
 15. “Sexual harassment” first entered the nation’s vocabulary in 1975. CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 27, 250 
n.13 (1979). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
 17. A tort is defined as a “private or civil wrong or injury, . . . for which the court will provide a 
remedy in the form of an action for damages.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990). 
 18. Victims of sexual harassment in the workplace have multiple common law remedies 
available to them including: “infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprisonment, 
invasion of privacy, defamation, misrepresentation, breach of public policy, implied contract and 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contractual relations, loss of 
consortium, and negligent hiring or retention.” BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 351-52 (1992). 
 19. See Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1475 (1986) (noting that tort law provides more relief than Title 
VII when a sexual harassment complainant suffers physical, psychological, or dignitary harm).  
 20. MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 161 (stating that while sex discrimination has a long history 
in women’s lives, the recognition of sexual harassment as sex discrimination lacks a history in the 
common law). 
 21. See, e.g., Smith v. Prudential Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (D.S.C. 1990) 
(recognizing no common law cause of action for sexual harassment).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/7
p639 Frank.doc  12/20/2001   9:25 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] THE PRIVACY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT PLAINTIFFS 643 
 
 
 
 
discriminatory conduct. Therefore, although sexual harassment plaintiffs 
have used tort actions to recover compensatory and punitive damages not 
fully available under Title VII,22 the common law has not produced the 
means to enable victims of workplace sexual harassment to combat their 
harassment in one cohesive action.23  
Before the creation of the sexual harassment cause of action, women 
brought claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress against their harassers.24 However, these tort actions insufficiently 
rectify workplace discrimination. Such discrimination often consists of 
verbal harassment without threatened or actual contact, which is required in 
order to recover assault and battery damages.25 Victims of verbal abuse can 
also seek redress for creation of a hostile work environment in actions for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.26 Although each of the tort actions 
confer damages for some harm caused, these claims do not make victims of 
sexual harassment whole because women cannot recover for societal sex 
discrimination perpetrated by their harassers. 
The common law fails to address fully the social issues surrounding the 
sexual harassment of women in the workplace. Even if a specific tort action 
existed for sexual harassment in the workplace, it would only address the 
personal effect on the victim27 rather than the societal problem that led to the 
harm alleged.28 If the law recognizes sexual harassment only as an individual 
 
 
 22. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(accepting jurisdiction over state law claims pendant to plaintiff’s Title VII claim). 
 23. Schoenheider, supra note 19, at 1485-94 (proposing the adoption of a specific tort claim for 
sexual harassment because of the incomplete remedies provided by tort law and Title VII). 
 24. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Ezell, 49 S.W. 775, 776 (Ky. 1899) (finding assault and battery when a 
man squeezed a woman’s breast and touched her face); Martin v. Jansen, 193 P. 674 (Wash. 1920) 
(awarding damages to a woman who claimed the defendant lewdly and lasciviously fondled her 
without consent). 
 25. Assault occurs when a person “acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the 
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and  . . . the other 
is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965). 
Battery requires unwelcome intentional contact that is harmful or offensive. Id. § 18. 
 26. Intentional infliction of emotional distress occurs when an individual acts outrageously, and 
in so doing, intentionally or recklessly inflicts severe emotional distress upon another. Id. § 46. 
 27. MacKinnon writes: 
[S]uggestions that sexual harassment be treated as a tort—a private harm—applies, unstated, the 
view that the interest to be protected is not so much an interest of women as a sex in employment 
opportunities as it is a personal interest. Torts best redress injuries to one’s person, here to 
individual sexuality as an aspect of the self, rather than to public and shared social existence, here 
sex in employment. 
MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 88. 
 28. MacKinnon notes: 
To the extent that tort theory fails to capture the broadly social sexuality/employment nexus that 
comprises the injury of sexual harassment, by treating the incidents as if they are outrages 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cause of action, (that is, one employer’s treatment of one woman), then it 
fails to address the gender discrimination pervasive throughout society that 
connects with sexual harassment and hinders the advancement of women in 
employment.29 The creation of a specific legal cause of action that recognizes 
sexual harassment will acknowledge that the sex discrimination permeating 
society infiltrates the workplace. To aid in the recognition of sexual 
harassment as pervasive sex discrimination throughout society, Catherine 
MacKinnon and other feminist scholars argued for a legal cause of action for 
sexual harassment under federal civil rights law.30  
B. Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in 
employment based on sex,31 race, color, religion, or national origin.32 
Because courts lacked legislative guidance as to what constituted 
discrimination based on gender,33 federal courts initially held that sexual 
 
 
particular to an individual woman rather than integral to her social status as a woman worker, the 
personal approach on the legal level fails to analyze the relevant dimensions of the problem. 
MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 88. 
 29. In the workforce, women remain concentrated in traditional “pink-collar” occupations. See J. 
RALPH LINDGREN & NADINE TAUB, THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 235-41 (1988). The disparity 
of women’s wages compared to men’s wages for the same or comparable job is another problem. 
While the earnings gap has diminished somewhat over the past two decades, women earned 75.4%  of 
what men earned in 1992. THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1994-1995, at 308-09 (Cynthia Costello & Anne J. 
Stone eds., 1994) (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings tbl. 56 (1993)). 
 30. See Cass Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 829 (1988) 
(reviewing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)). The idea that sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination, “for which MacKinnon is given too little credit, seemed 
bizarre and radical to many when initially put forward. Remarkably, MacKinnon’s basic position was 
accepted in 1986 by every member of the Supreme Court . . . .” Id. For an assessment of the impact of 
sexual harassment of working women, see Holly B. Fechner, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law 
Reform: Sexual Harassment Law and the Reconstruction of Facts, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475 
(1990). 
 31. One commentator wrote the following: 
The statute’s prohibition on gender discrimination was a last minute addition, made through an 
amendment on the floor of the House of Representatives. The amendment, adding ‘sex’ to Title 
VII’s list of prohibited bases for discrimination, was proposed by conservative opponents of the 
civil rights legislation who believed that it would lead to the defeat of the entire bill. 
Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the 
Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 409 n.62 (1996). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 
 33. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (“The legislative history of Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its brevity.”). See also Meritor Sav. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/7
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harassment was not sex discrimination under Title VII. Although most courts 
were reluctant to define sexual harassment as sex-based discrimination, one 
district court in 197634 found that sexual harassment violates Title VII. Other 
courts began to follow suit.35 
1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment 
The first claims actionable under Title VII were for quid pro quo sexual 
harassment when an employer conditions an employment practice upon 
sexual relations.36 In quid pro quo sexual harassment, an employer or fellow 
employee either makes sexual activity a condition of a woman’s employment 
or affects the employment status of a woman who refuses sexual activity.37 
Women whose supervisors had fired them for refusing sexual advances 
brought the first successful Title VII quid pro quo sexual harassment suits.38 
2. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
In the 1980s, courts found that a sexual harassment claim might exist 
when an employer creates or condones a substantially discriminatory work 
environment regardless of whether the complainant lost tangible job benefits 
as a result of the harassing environment.39 In 1982, the Court of Appeals for 
 
 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (stating that the last minute addition of sex-based 
discrimination to Title VII left the Court with “little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the 
Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex’”). 
 34. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that retaliatory actions of a 
male supervisor, taken because a female employee declined his sexual advances, constitute sex 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
 35. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. 
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 
1977). 
 36. “If an employer threatens to dismiss, demote, or eliminate some employment opportunity 
unless the employee engages in sexual relations, the employer violates Title VII. Similarly, promising 
an employee an employment opportunity in exchange for sexual relations is a violation.” Fechner, 
supra note 30, at 488-89. 
 37. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, or (2) submission to or 
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting 
such individual. 
EEOC 1980 Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995). 
 38. See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding that plaintiff was 
harassed and fired for refusing supervisor’s sexual demands); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (finding that complainant’s job that was abolished after refusing to accept superior’s sexual 
advances constituted quid pro quo harassment). 
 39. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 
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the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee40 defined the elements of a 
prima facie hostile work environment case: (1) the employee belongs to a 
protected group,41 (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome conduct of 
a sexual nature, (3) the harassment was based on sex, (4) the harassment 
affected a term or condition of employment,42 and (5) the employer is 
responsible for the harassment. The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank 
v. Vinson43 held that “a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by 
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive 
working environment.”44 To establish the hostility of a work environment, 
the sexual harassment must be both unwelcome45 and sufficiently pervasive 
to alter the conditions of employment. 
In 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,46 the Supreme Court further 
defined the requirements of proving a hostile work environment under Title 
VII.47 Because Title VII does not require mental injury, the Court rejected 
inquiry into a plaintiff’s “concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII 
does not require.”48 Instead of examining the mental injury suffered by the 
 
 
934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). EEOC 1980 Guidelines on Sexual Harassment instruct that “such conduct has 
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). 
 40. 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 41. Id. at 903 (following the guidance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff belongs to a 
protected class if the individual suffers discrimination due to his or her race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin).  
 42. Id. at 904 (holding that psychological well-being is a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment). 
 43. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 44. Id. at 66. 
 45. “The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 
‘unwelcome.’” Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). 
 46. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 47. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris, there was a split in the circuits concerning 
how hostile a defendant’s actions, or how severe a plaintiff’s injury, had to be to recover under Title 
VII. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit applied a two-
part test for evaluating a hostile work environment. The court held that the plaintiff must prove (1) that 
the harasser’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and would “affect seriously the psychological 
well-being of [a] reasonable person under like circumstances” and (2) that the plaintiff suffered “some 
degree of injury as a result of the abusive and hostile work environment.” Id. at 620. The EEOC 
specifically disagreed with the Rabidue approach to examining a hostile work environment claim, 
stating that a plaintiff need not prove actual psychological injury to state a claim. EEOC Policy 
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6681, 405:6690 n.20 (Mar. 19, 
1990).  
 Following the EEOC’s recommendations, the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th 
Cir. 1991), found that the proper focus for the determination of a hostile work environment is on the 
harasser’s conduct rather than evidence of injury to the accuser. The court stated that “Title VII’s 
protection of employees from sex discrimination comes into play long before the point where victims 
of sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance.” Id. at 878.  
 48. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/7
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victim, Title VII focuses on the employer’s conduct to determine whether it 
created an objectively49 hostile or abusive work environment50 and whether 
the plaintiff subjectively perceived a hostile work environment.51 By refusing 
to place the sexual harassment plaintiff’s mental health under a microscope, 
the Court further tailored the means by which Title VII would work for the 
eradication of workplace sex discrimination.52  
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Title VII originally permitted a prevailing plaintiff to recover back pay, 
job reinstatement, an injunction against the discriminatory conduct,53 and 
certain litigation costs.54 However, many sexual harassment victims found 
that bringing a Title VII action against an employer did not compensate for 
the embarrassment, humiliation, and other psychological problems that they 
suffered due to the sexual harassment.55  
In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act to allow victims of 
sexual harassment to recover compensatory damages.56 Since its amendment, 
prevailing plaintiffs in a claim for intentional discrimination under Title VII 
may seek compensatory damages for “emotional pain, suffering, 
 
 
 49. The circuit courts are split on what test is appropriate for determining an objectively hostile 
work environment. Some courts apply a reasonable woman standard. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 
Inc., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Yates v. Avco 
Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). Other courts apply a reasonable person standard. Watkins v. 
Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1997); Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. 
Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995); Hirschfeld v. N.M. Corrections Dep’t, 916 F.2d 
572 (10th Cir. 1990); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), superseded on other 
grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 50. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive 
work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond 
Title VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Kent D. Streseman, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts: 
Reexamining Compelled Mental Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1268, 1289 (1995).  
The “actual injury” test compromised Title VII’s power to transform workplaces by unduly 
focusing inquiry on the mental fortitude of discrimination victims. Harris cements the notion that 
a primary aim of Title VII is to eradicate gender-based hostility from the workplace, and that 
judicial inquiry in sexual harassment actions must focus on that goal.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). 
 54. Id. § 2000e-5(k). 
 55. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 18. Victims of sexual harassment experience more 
than losing their jobs or salaries. They often suffer severe psychological and physical consequences 
that are not addressed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. 
 56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a), (b) (1994). 
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inconvenience, mental anguish, [and] loss of enjoyment of life.”57 In enacting 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress intended for “citizens to act as private 
attorneys general”58 working against workplace discrimination. Victims of 
sexual harassment would be made whole59 by recovering compensatory 
damages for the “terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional 
health, and to their self-respect and dignity.”60 However, to recover 
compensatory damages, plaintiffs must “prove actual injury or loss.”61 
Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 puts mental injury at issue, this 
requirement may operate as a waiver of the federal psychotherapist-patient 
privilege for analysis of a sexual harassment plaintiff’s mental health 
records.62 
III. JUDICIAL REGULATION OF THE FEDERAL PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
The requirement that Title VII sexual harassment plaintiffs prove actual 
mental anguish to recover compensatory damages harms the protective 
purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Defendants will move to 
waive the privilege and delve into the mental health history of their accusers 
to attempt to debunk the claims of emotional distress.63 To access the mental 
 
 
 57. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the total amount of compensatory damages awarded for 
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment 
of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the total punitive damages awarded for each complaining 
party shall not exceed: (1) $50,000 for employers with more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees, 
(2) $200,000, for employers with more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees, and (3) $300,000 for 
employers with more than 500 employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603.  
 59. Id. The House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor recognized the need 
for monetary damages as a means “mak[ing]discrimination victims whole.” Id. “All too frequently 
Title VII leaves prevailing plaintiffs without remedies for their injuries and allows employers who 
discriminate to avoid any meaningful liability.” Id. at 68, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 606. 
 60. Id. at 65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603. “Victims of intentional discrimination 
often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering, psychological harm and related medical 
problems, which in turn cause victims of discrimination to suffer substantial out-of-pocket medical 
expenses and other economic losses as a result of the discrimination.” Id. at 66, reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 604. 
 61. Id. at 72, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 549, 606 (emphasis removed). “Strict standards 
limit the recovery of damages by plaintiffs with meritorious claims. Plaintiffs must first prove 
intentional discrimination, then must prove actual injury or loss arising therefrom to recover 
compensatory damages.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. For a discussion of the treatment of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in a 
damages claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 63. Defendants might use the mental health records of their accusers to establish that 
psychological injury existed prior to the harassment. Defendants could use these records to allege 
either that their victims were overly sensitive due to other mental health problems, or that the victims 
were trying to get compensation for emotional damages stemming from previous occurrences. 
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health records of an adverse party, the movant must show that the adverse 
party has waived the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege.64 Federal 
courts have held that plaintiffs who claim damages for emotional distress 
place their mental state at issue and thereby constructively waive their 
privileges over their mental health records.65 However, the courts have failed 
to answer definitively the question of whether a Title VII claim of gender-
based discrimination serves as a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.66  
A. Development of the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 mandates that federal privilege67 law “shall 
be governed by the principles of the common law . . . in light of reason and 
experience.”68 Federal Rule 501 fails to recognize a specific psychotherapist-
privilege. Nine specific privileges,69 however, were included in the original 
draft of the Federal Rules.70 Because Rule 501 fails to establish guidelines 
concerning specific privileges, federal courts adopted different means for 
adjudication of the psychotherapist-patient privilege claims.71 
 
 
 64. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996). 
 65. See infra Parts III.B.1-2. 
 66. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 67. A privilege is “a rule that gives a person a right to refuse to disclose information to a tribunal 
that would otherwise be entitled to demand and make use of that information in performing its 
assigned function.” 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422, at 667 (1980). 
 68. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides in full:  
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of 
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege 
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the 
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an 
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a 
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in 
accordance with State law. 
 69. The nine specific privileges contained in the original Federal Rules are: privilege for 
statutorily privileged required reports, attorney and client privilege, psychotherapist and patient 
privilege, husband and wife privilege, communications to clergy privilege, political vote privilege, 
trade secrets privilege, secret of state privilege, and identity of informer privilege. 46 F.R.D. 161, 248-
79 (1969). The psychotherapist-patient privilege was originally contained in Proposed Rule 504. The 
Proposed Federal Rule 504 defined the terms “confidential”, “psychotherapist”, and “patient”. The 
Rule stated the general rule of psychotherapist-patient privilege, who could claim the privilege, and 
three exceptions to the general rule. Id. at 257-59.  
 70. Id. at 243-84. 
 71. Federal courts exhibited confusion over the existence of a federal psychotherapist-patient 
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits refused to 
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law because it did not exist at common law. 
Three other circuits applied a balancing test to determine the relevance of the psychological records 
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In Jaffee v. Redmond,72 the Supreme Court established an absolute federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.73 The Court compared the psychotherapist-
patient privilege to both the attorney-client74 and spousal75 privileges and 
reasoned that all three are “‘rooted’ in the imperative need for confidence and 
trust.”76 The Court focused on a patient’s willingness to disclose fully facts 
and feelings for successful psychotherapy and noted that the possibility of 
disclosure might hinder the communication between patients and 
psychotherapists.77 The decision in Jaffee rejected balancing the patient’s 
privacy interest with evidentiary need78 and established that the 
 
 
compared to the plaintiff’s right to privacy. 
 In United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit stated that “[a]t 
common law, no physician-patient privilege existed and, therefore, we recognize no such privilege.” 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1988), held 
that because the common law does not create any type of physician-patient privilege, the court would 
not recognize the psychotherapist privilege. Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege “does not exist at common law. Because our discretion under Rule 501 is limited to 
the development of privileges extant in the common law, we affirm the district court’s denial of the 
motion to quash subpoenas of Doe’s psychiatric records.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 
565 (9th Cir. 1989).  
 Comparatively, the Sixth, Second, and Tenth Circuit each employed a balancing test in their case-
by-case determination of whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege was existed. In Zuniga v. 
Pierce, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit focused on the necessity of therapeutic 
relationships in its determination of the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court 
found that society’s interests in successful psychotherapy “outweigh the need for evidence in the 
administration of criminal justice.” Id. at 639. The Second Circuit in United States v. Diamond, 964 
F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992), employed a balancing test to recognize a “highly qualified” psychotherapist-
patient privilege. Id. at 1328. The court rationalized that in its case-by-case determination “the 
privilege amounts only to a requirement that a court give consideration to [an individual’s] privacy 
interests as an important factor to be weighed in the balance in considering the admissibility of 
psychiatric histories or diagnoses.” Id. at 1329. Similarly, in United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 
(10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit employed a balancing test in its case-by-case determination of the 
existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege  
 72. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 73. Id. at 8-10. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s recognition of the federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 74. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interest in the observance of 
law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
 75. The spousal privilege “furthers the important public interest in marital harmony.” Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). 
 76. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51). 
 77. “Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult 
psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may 
cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede 
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.” Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 
10. 
 78. 518 U.S. at 17-18. 
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the 
relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure 
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. As we explained in Upjohn, if the purpose of 
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psychotherapist-patient privilege could not be qualified by consideration of 
evidentiary need.79 
B. Judicial Determination of Claims of Emotional Distress as Waiver of 
the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
The Jaffee court stated that “like other testimonial privileges, the patient 
may of course waive the protection”80 of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. However, the Court provided no guidance on the question of how a 
waiver might occur.81 The Court also failed to address whether a mental-
state-at-issue claim constitutes a waiver of the privilege.82 The only example 
the Court provided of a situation in which the privilege must yield is when a 
patient or others could avoid a serious threat of harm by the therapist’s 
disclosure.83  
1. Claiming Emotional Distress Damages and Waiving Your 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
Following the establishment of the federal psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, several courts have found that a plaintiff automatically waives her 
privilege by bringing damages claims for emotional distress related to 
employment discrimination.84 In finding waiver of privilege, the court in 
 
 
the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential communication “must be able to 
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An 
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications 
by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”  
Id. (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981)). 
 79. Id. at 11-12. 
 80. Id. at 15 n.14. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Federal courts accept the rule that plaintiffs who claim damages for emotional distress place 
their mental state at issue and thereby waive their privilege in communications with their 
psychotherapist. See, e.g., Topol v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 83. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19. See Alexandra P. West, Implying Plaintiffs’ Waivers of the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 901, 905 (1998). The 
Supreme Court’s has stated that one potential example waiving the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
might be when “the extreme nature of the situation lends support to the argument that courts should 
give the privilege substantial weight in the waiver formula.” Id.  
 84. See, e.g., Sidor v. Reno, 1998 WL 164823, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998) (holding that 
“while not dispositive,” the greater number of cases have found waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege by seeking damages for emotional distress); McKenna v. Cruz, 1998 WL 809533, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y.) (finding a waiver of privilege because the majority of post-Jaffee cases hold that any claim 
for emotional or psychological injury waives the privilege); Kerman v. City of New York, 1997 WL 
666261, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.) (relying on the multiple courts, that have applied the exception of proposed 
Federal Rule of Evidence 504 and holding that privilege is waived when a plaintiff places her mental 
condition at issue). 
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Sarko v. Penn-Dell Directory Co.85 relied upon Jaffee’s analogy of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege to the attorney-client privilege,86 which is 
waived when the advice of counsel is placed at issue.87 In Sarko, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reasoned that 
“allowing a plaintiff ‘to hide . . . behind a claim of privilege when that 
condition is placed directly at issue in a case would simply be contrary to the 
most basic sense of fairness and justice.’”88 One year later, in Fox v. Gates 
Corp.,89 the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado waived the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege after relying upon the exception90 provided 
in the Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 that “there is no privilege as to 
communications relevant to the mental or emotional condition of the patient 
in any proceeding in which the patient relies on the condition as an element 
of the patient’s claim or defense.”91 The rationale of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, in finding waiver of the privilege in Lanning v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,92 rested simply on the fact that 
 
 
 85. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The plaintiff alleged 
that her former employer had not made reasonable accommodations for her clinical depression. Id. 
Plaintiff brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 129. She alleged that it was 
difficult for her to wake up in the morning due to the medication prescribed to treat her condition and 
that her employer fired her for coming to work late due to her disability. Id.  
 86. “[T]he Supreme Court specifically analogized the policy considerations supporting 
recognition of privilege in Jaffee to those underlying the attorney-client privilege.” 170 F.R.D. at 130. 
 87. The court reasoned that, like the attorney-client privilege, the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege would be waived when the patient places her mental condition at issue. Id. The court held 
that the plaintiff waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege because she placed her mental condition 
directly at issue. Id. The court determined that the plaintiff’s contention, that she was a member of a 
protected class due to her clinical depression, placed her mental condition directly at issue. Id. The 
plaintiff’s medical records are necessary to determine whether she suffered from clinical depression 
and whether her condition necessitated medication. Id. 
 88. Id. at 130 (quoting Premack v. J.C.J. Ogar, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 140, 145 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). 
 89. Fox v. Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303 (D. Colo. 1998). Plaintiff sought compensatory damages 
for emotional distress, pain and suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, and anguish in connection with 
her claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 304. The court held that the plaintiff had 
waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege to her mental health records by bringing a claim for 
emotional distress damages along with her employment discrimination action. Id. Although the 
plaintiff had no intention of calling her health care providers to testify, the court determined that 
defendants could compel discovery of her mental health records because she had placed her mental 
condition in issue. Id.   
 90. Id. at 305-06. The court relied upon the decision in Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443 
(10th Cir. 1990), which had been decided prior to Jaffee. In Dixon, the court found that the plaintiff 
had waived her privilege, “as those communications may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
regarding plaintiff’s present claim for emotional distress damages.” Fox, 179 F.R.D. at 306. The Fox 
court decided that Jaffee did not require a different result because the Dixon decision had not been 
determined based upon the balancing test that Jaffee overruled. Id. 
 91. Id. (quoting proposed FED. R. EVID. 504(d)(3)). 
 92. 1997 WL 597905 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997). The court’s decision does not reveal the basis for 
the plaintiffs’ cause of action, except that among the claims was one for emotional distress relating to 
employment discrimination. Id. at *2. The defendant’s motion to compel plaintiffs’ psychological and 
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although the plaintiffs stipulated that they would not seek damages for 
psychological injury or recovery for treatment of emotional distress, and had 
not alleged an independent claim of emotional distress, their emotional 
distress damages sufficiently placed their mental state at issue.93 
2. Claiming Emotional Distress Damages?: Additional Circumstances 
May Waive Your Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
Other courts have found that waiver of the federal psychotherapist-patient 
privilege will not occur merely by bringing claims for emotional distress 
damages related to employment discrimination.94 The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, in Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark,95 reasoned 
that the mental state at issue waiver eviscerates the certainty of the existence 
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege mandated by Jaffee.96 Because Jaffee 
analogized the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the attorney-client 
privilege, the Vanderbilt court determined that waiver of the privileged 
 
 
psychiatric records was granted because the court determined that the plaintiffs’ mental condition was 
at issue. Id. 
 93. Id. at *2. The court stated that “[d]espite plaintiffs’ attempts to limit damages regarding 
emotional distress, the claim for emotional distress remains a part of plaintiffs’ action.” Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 227 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that when a 
plaintiff places her mental condition at issue by asserting other than a “garden-variety” claim, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege to current and ongoing mental health records is waived); Booker v. 
Boston, 1999 WL 734644 at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 1999) (holding that privilege is not waived by a 
claim for emotional distress unless the plaintiff makes positive use of the privileged material in the 
prosecution of her case); Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding 
that plaintiff did not waive psychotherapist-patient privilege by seeking emotional distress damages 
where he did not put at issue the consultations he had or treatments he received from mental health 
professionals); United States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp.2d 1187, 1190 (D. Ore. 1998) (“The relevance of an 
issue to a proceeding does not operate to waive privileges the law confers on protected conversations 
about that issue. In the typical case, the privilege is waived by the privilege holder’s volunteering 
statements or testimony about the content of the protected communication.”). 
 95. 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997). Plaintiff was an employee of the Town of Chilmark. Id. at 
226. She alleged that she was discriminated on the basis of her gender because of a disparity in the 
wages received by a male employee who was in a comparable position to her. Id. She sued the town 
for violation of federal and state discrimination laws. Id. Her complaint sought damages for emotional 
distress. Id. The court stated that it is unclear when a plaintiff has in fact placed her mental state at 
issue. Id. at 228. The court determined that the claim may have placed her mental state at issue, but it 
did not waive the privileged nature of her communications with her psychotherapist. Id. at 230. 
 96. The court relied upon the statement in Jaffee that “[i]f the purpose of the privilege is to be 
served, the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict with some degree of 
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.’” Id. at 227 (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18). 
The court focused on the differing responses of other courts in determining when and how patients 
place their mental state at issue. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 227. Under the differing determinations of 
the mental state at issue waiver, patients entering therapy would not know with certainty whether their 
communications would later be privileged. This uncertainty could eviscerate the certainty of the 
privilege required by Jaffee. Id. at 229.  
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communications would occur if the mental health records were an issue in 
the litigation, not if they were merely relevant.97 In Fritsch v. City of Chula 
Vista,98 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California 
reasoned that waiver of the privilege occurs only where the patient either 
calls her therapist as a witness,99 or introduces into evidence the substance of 
any therapist-patient communication.100 The Fritsch court stated: “To hold 
that merely claiming emotional distress damages in a civil lawsuit would 
constitute a waiver of the privilege would . . . be contrary to the spirit and 
clear intent of Jaffee”101 that the privilege not be waived easily.102 In 
Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Department of Social Services,103 the U.S. 
 
 
 97. The court stated that the attorney-client privilege is waived when the privileged 
communications are placed at issue in the trial. Id. at 229. This is the case when, for example, a client 
claims reliance on an attorney’s advice as a defense or sues her attorney for malpractice. Id. However, 
merely seeking attorney fees does not waive the privilege. Id. Similarly, “[a] patient whose cause of 
action relies on the advice of findings of her psychotherapist cannot claim the privilege.” Id. at 229. 
However, seeking damages for emotional distress is similar to seeking attorney’s fees. Id. “The fact 
that a privileged communication has taken place may be relevant. But the fact that a communication 
has taken place does not necessarily put its content at issue.” Id. at 229. 
 98. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The plaintiff, who was a 
former assistant city attorney, was fired for refusing to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 615. 
The plaintiff alleged employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
retaliatory action. The plaintiff also alleged violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing 
Act, invasion of privacy, breach of an implied contract of employment, and defamation. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Doolittle v. Ruffo, 1997 WL 151799 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997). The plaintiff 
moved for the return of all medical, hospital, and psychological records pertaining to the case. Id. at 
*1. She also moved the court to reverse an earlier order permitting the defendants to use deposition 
testimony and records of the plaintiff’s therapist. Id. The court stated that “[f]rom the outset [the 
plaintiff] has argued that defendants’ actions caused her to suffer a breakdown which has prevented 
her from returning to work.” Id. at *2. In addition, the court stated that plaintiff’s intention to call her 
therapist to testify at trial and the extreme nature of her emotional damages claims necessitated a 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at *3. 
 100. Fritsch, 187 F.R.D. at 629. After an extensive review of the post-Jaffee cases addressing 
when a court can compel discovery of a patient’s privileged communications with a psychotherapist, 
the court determined that a number of other courts found waiver when the party intended to call the 
therapist as a witness, when the substance of the communications were at issue, or when the patients 
claimed that they suffered from a mental illness. Id. The court reasoned that in Sarko, Doolittle, and 
Kirchner, fairness required a finding of waiver of privilege to the communications. Id. However, the 
Fritsch court determined that these courts did not give enough weight to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege because they determined that the privilege was waived because the mental state was “at 
issue,” rather than looking to the facts of the case. Id.  
 101. Id. at 630. 
 102. The Jaffee court intended for the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege to create 
confidential relationships for successful treatment. Id. It intended the privilege to be reliable for the 
good of the patients, rather than easily waived to allow “fishing expeditions” that might discover 
whether or not evidence of psychological injury existed. Id. at 631. 
 103. 194 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). A former employee took a leave from his position at the 
county department of social services and brought suit against the department for disability 
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 446-47. Plaintiff alleged that 
the county defendants perceived him to be disabled and discriminated against him based upon that 
perceived disability. Id. at 446. Defendants sought plaintiff’s medical and psychiatric records. Id.  
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District Court for the Northern District of New York held that a plaintiff does 
not put her mental condition in issue by merely seeking incidental “garden-
variety”104 emotional distress damages.105 The court stated: “To condition 
recovery for emotional distress incidental to the violation of federal 
constitutional and statutory rights upon the surrender of the protection of the 
psychotherapist privilege is also antithetical to the purpose of the laws that 
provide redress for such violations.”106 
3. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Emotional Distress Damages 
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: No Clear Consensus 
Very little case law exists concerning the application of the federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege in Title VII sexual harassment claims for 
emotional distress damages. A number of courts have reasoned that a claim 
for emotional distress damages serves as an automatic waiver of privilege 
because the plaintiff has put her mental state at issue.107 In Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Danka Industries, Inc.,108 the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri reasoned that the plaintiffs 
mental condition is significantly related to the issue of damages so as to 
waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege because they sought damages for 
emotional distress resulting from the alleged sexual harassment.109 The U.S. 
 
 
 104. The court stated as follows: 
“Garden variety” means ordinary or commonplace. Garden-variety emotional distress, therefore, 
is ordinary or commonplace emotional distress. Garden-variety emotional distress is that which 
simple or usual. In contrast, emotional distress that is not garden-variety may be complex, such as 
that resulting in a specific psychiatric disorder, or may be unusual, such as to disable one from 
working. 
Id. at 449 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 105. 194 F.R.D. at 449-50. 
 106. Id. at 451. “Moreover, a finding that seeking incidental emotional distress damages places 
mental condition at issue, requiring a plaintiff to disclose psychotherapist communications would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.” Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2000) (relying on case law 
espousing different views and without analysis, holding that a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 places mental condition at issue, waiving the psychotherapist-patient privilege). 
 108. 990 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1997). The EEOC and employees brought a sexual harassment 
action against their employers under Title VII alleging that a supervisor had committed verbal and 
physical acts of sexual harassment. Id. at 1140. Citing Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of 
Springfield, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 346, 349-50 (C.D. Ill. 1997),  and Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 
F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the court observed that other courts have found waiver of the privilege 
when the patient’s mental condition is made an issue in the litigation. Id. at 1142. The court held that a 
Title VII emotional distress claim for sexual harassment places a patient’s mental condition at issue in 
the litigation, so as to waive the privilege. Id. 
 109. The court stated that the mental condition of the plaintiffs is directly related to the damages 
they seek. Id. at 1142. “Defendant is entitled to discover to what extent the plaintiffs’ mental 
condition, prior to the alleged harassment, may have contributed to any emotional distress for which 
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District Court for the Northern District of New York, in Cleveland v. 
International Paper, Co.,110 reasoned that because the plaintiff sought 
compensation based on her emotional distress from the alleged sexual 
harassment, it should waive the privileged communications between plaintiff 
and her therapist in order to determine whether prior psychological damage 
influenced her subjective perceptions of the harassment.111  
Comparatively, other courts have found that waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege will only occur with the addition of other 
claims to the civil rights action or the introduction of the therapist’s and 
patient’s mental health records as evidence.112 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maryland, in Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc.,113 
balanced the claims brought by a plaintiff in sexual harassment litigation 
against the defendant’s evidentiary need of mental health records. The court 
concluded that if the plaintiff withdrew the additional damages claims for 
severe emotional pain and suffering,114 no waiver of the privileged nature of 
the communications would occur115 because her mental state was no longer 
at issue. The court refused to grant the defendant’s motion to compel the 
plaintiff’s privileged mental health records because the plaintiff has a privacy 
 
 
they now seek [damages].” Id. 
 110. 1997 WL 309408 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 1997). 
 111. Id. at *2. “Defendant is entitled to information tending to show that Cleveland’s alleged 
emotional distress ‘was caused at least in part by events and circumstances that were not job related.’” 
Id. (citing Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Therefore, the court 
granted discovery of the plaintiff’s mental health records. Int’l Paper Co., 1997 WL 309408, at *2. 
 112. See, e.g., Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Springfield, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 346 
(C.D. Ill. 1997). The plaintiff alleged that her former employer had engaged in unwelcome and 
offensive touching and had made suggestive comments to her. Id. at 347. She claimed that as a result 
of the alleged conduct, she lost her job and suffered emotional injury. Id. at 348. Relying on a case 
decided prior to Jaffee, the court determined that because the plaintiff was seeking damages for 
emotional distress, she had placed her mental condition at issue. Id. at 349. In addition, by calling her 
treating therapist as an expert witness to testify at trial, she waived her privilege to her 
communications with her therapist. Id. 
 113. 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1997). The plaintiff alleged that she had been assaulted and 
sexually harassed by a co-worker and had required medical treatment for her mental and physical 
health. Id. at 703-04. The plaintiff brought suit for claims of sexual harassment under the Civil Rights 
Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act. 
Id. at 704. The defendant sought to compel discovery of her mental health records. Id. 
 114. The plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress necessitated proof that the 
plaintiff actually suffered severe emotional distress. Id. at 708. The court also reasoned that because 
plaintiff was requesting a large amount of damages based upon the alleged emotional distress, her 
mental state was at issue so as to waive the privilege. Id. 
 115. The court stated that the plaintiff had the option to file an amended complaint that would 
withdraw the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as the requested damages 
from that emotional distress. Id. at 709. The court cited Covell v. CNG Transmission Corp., 863 F. 
Supp. 202, 206 (M.D. Pa. 1994), for the proposition that “defendants claim that privilege was waived 
when mental state was placed in issue was rendered moot by plaintiff’s withdrawal of claims for 
emotional pain and suffering.” Id. 
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right to limit the discovery of the defendant to information narrowly tailored 
to relevant issues of the lawsuit.116 The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, in Allen v. Cook County Sheriff’s Department,117 refused 
to grant the defendant’s motion to compel the mental health records of a 
sexual harassment plaintiff because she had not placed the substance of her 
communications at issue by claiming that “she has suffered emotional harm 
at the hands of the defendants by the sexually hostile work environment 
permitted by them to exist”.118 However, the court cautioned that 
“[f]undamental fairness demands that the defendants should have ample 
opportunity to scrutinize the basis for the opinions of [the plaintiff’s] 
therapists if she attempts to elicit therapist testimony or evidence to prove her 
damages caused by her alleged emotional distress.”119 Similarly, in Santelli v. 
Electro-Motive,120 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
found that a plaintiff in a Title VII action had not waived her 
psychotherapist-patient privilege by seeking emotional distress damages 
limited to humiliation, embarrassment, and other similar emotions arising out 
of the alleged sex discrimination.121 However, the court reasoned: “Bare 
testimony of humiliation or disgust may prevent her from fully recovering for 
her alleged emotional distress. She may be better off disclosing her 
psychological records, which would allow her to make a broader damage 
claim.”122 
 
 
 116. 962 F. Supp. at 709. The plaintiff has a right to have discovery limited to matters relevant to 
the lawsuit and the defendant’s request was too broad. Id. See also Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 
F. Supp. 216, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[A]lthough the defendants will be permitted to inquire into 
plaintiff’s personal histories, it must be emphasized that defendants may not engage in a fishing 
expedition by inquiring into matters totally irrelevant to the issue of emotional distress. In other words, 
the scope of the inquiry must be limited to whether, and to what extent, the alleged harassment caused 
plaintiffs to suffer emotional harm.”).  
 117. 1999 WL 168466 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1999). The plaintiff claimed that the defendants 
subjected her to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at *1. 
The plaintiff sought compensation for alleged emotional distress. Id.  
 118. Id. at *2. 
 119. Id. The court reasoned that although the plaintiff has not placed her mental state at issue in 
the litigation, she ran the risk of waiver if her mental condition was placed at issue. Id. If plaintiff 
“discloses her psychotherapist as an expert witness to establish that she has suffered emotional distress 
as a result of the alleged sexual harassment, then she opens the door to her confidential information.” 
Id. (citing Danka Indus., Inc., 996 F. Supp. at 1142, and Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130). 
 120. Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The plaintiff brought a Title VII 
action against her employer alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. Id. at 307. The defendant 
moved to compel production of plaintiff’s mental health records and argued that her claim of 
emotional distress waived any privileges. Id. 
 121. Id. at 309. “[P]laintiff’s communications to her psychotherapist are no longer relevant, or if 
relevant are only barely so.” Id. 
 122. Id. 
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IV. COMPARABLE MEASURES TO THE FEDERAL PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE EXIST TO PROTECT THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
PLAINTIFF IN LITIGATION 
The federal psychotherapist-patient privilege exists, in part, to protect a 
sexual harassment plaintiff from undue invasion of her private therapy 
sessions when the information lacks relevance to the litigated issue.123 
Similarly, Federal Rules exist that also serve as protection for the privacy 
interests of a sexual harassment plaintiff. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 
allows mental examinations of litigants when mental health is placed “in 
controversy” and the opposing party shows “good cause” for the order.124 
Many courts have protected sexual harassment plaintiffs because of the 
conclusion that Title VII claims do not satisfy the requisite “in controversy” 
requirement for mental health examinations.125 Federal Rule of Evidence 412 
protects the privacy of a sexual harassment plaintiff from exposure of her 
sexual history in civil cases because it is not relevant to the litigation.126 
A. Compelled Mental Examinations of Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to obtain a 
court order forcing another party to submit to a mental examination by a 
doctor or psychiatrist.127 Whether a court will allow a compelled mental 
examination depends upon the extent to which a party’s condition is in 
controversy and if good cause is shown.128 Schlagenhauf v. Holder,129 the 
 
 
 123. See Bridges, 850 F. Supp. at 223. 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). 
 125. See infra Part IV.A. 
 126. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 127. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a) provides in relevant part: 
ORDER FOR EXAMINATION. When the mental or physical condition  . . . of a party  . . . is in 
controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or 
mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner  . . . . The order may be made only 
on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties 
and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person 
or persons by whom it is to be made. 
 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 35 advisory committee notes of the 1970 Amendment state that “before a 
court order may issue, the relevant physical or mental condition must be shown to be ‘in controversy’ 
and ‘good cause’ must be shown for examination.” 
 129. 379 U.S. 104 (1964). The plaintiffs were passengers injured when their bus collided with a 
truck. In answer to a cross-claim, the defendant truck company charged that the bus driver had not 
been “mentally or physically capable” of driving the bus safely. Id. at 107. The truck company moved 
for an order compelling the bus driver to submit to both a mental and physical examination. Id. The 
Supreme Court overruled the order of the district court for the bus driver to submit to examinations in 
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only U.S. Supreme Court case to construe the scope of Rule 35, found that 
the “good cause” and “in controversy” requirements of the Rule create a 
greater burden than the requirements for relevancy.130 The Court stated that 
the requirements are:  
not met by mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings—nor by mere 
relevance to the case—but require an affirmative showing by the 
movant that each condition as to which the examination is sought is 
really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for 
ordering each particular examination.131 
While a movant must produce sufficient evidence to justify an examination, 
the Court held that when the plaintiff asserts a physical or mental injury in a 
negligence action, the pleadings themselves will place her mental condition 
in controversy.132  
Courts have generally determined that sexual harassment plaintiffs who 
seek relief under Title VII do not place their mental condition in sufficient 
controversy to compel examination,133 whereas those seeking tort remedies 
generally do.134 Courts have recognized that disallowing unnecessary mental 
examinations serves to protect the privacy interests of the sexual harassment 
plaintiff135 and the public policy concerns behind the enactment of Title 
VII.136 In this same regard, many courts have refused to extend to the Civil 
 
 
internal medicine, ophthalmology, neurology, and psychiatry. Id. at 119. While there was some 
evidence that the driver might have some vision impairment, the Court determined that this was not 
enough to place the driver’s mental condition in controversy. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 118. 
 132. Id. at 119. 
 133. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Cody v. 
Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that allegations of sexual harassment under 
Title VII do not place a plaintiff’s mental condition in controversy to warrant a mental examination). 
See also Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 409 (Cal. 1987). 
A simple sexual harassment claim asking compensation for having to endure an oppressive work 
environment or for wages lost following an unjust dismissal would not create a controversy 
regarding plaintiff’s mental state. To hold otherwise would mean that every person who brings 
such a suit implicitly asserts he or she is mentally unstable, obviously an untenable proposition. 
Id. 
 134. See Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421, 423 (D. Mass. 1984) (stating that when a 
plaintiff “refers to specific mental and psychiatric injuries, the plaintiff is affirmatively placing into 
controversy a mental condition” which allows the ordering of a mental examination). See also, e.g., 
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F. Supp. 635, 636 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (ordering mental examination 
because claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress placed plaintiff’s mental condition in 
controversy); Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 296, 298-99 (E.D. Pa. 1983); 
Brandenberg v. El Al Israel Airlines, 79 F.R.D. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 135. Robinson, 118 F.R.D. at 531. 
 136. Id. (stating that Congress intended that Title VII would encourage victims to bring claims of 
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Rights Act of 1991 an inference of a tort claim for emotional distress that 
would place mental condition in controversy.137 Congress did not privatize 
Title VII with the new provisions, and it remains a civil rights cause of action 
with additional incentive to empower victims to act as “private attorneys 
general.”138 Therefore, the claims of emotional distress that result from 
sexual harassment usually do not place the plaintiff’s mental condition in 
controversy to necessitate mental examinations without additional tort 
claims.139 
B. Protection of the Sexual Harassment Plaintiff Under Rule 412 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
To prove the existence of a hostile work environment, a sexual 
harassment plaintiff must prove both the unwelcomeness of the harasser’s 
conduct, and that she found the conduct undesirable.140 The 
“unwelcomeness” requirement led some courts to allow the discovery and 
introduction of evidence of plaintiff’s appearance, dress, and sexual activities 
unrelated to interactions with the alleged harasser.141 Congress amended 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412142 to extend the criminal federal rape shield 
 
 
sexual harassment rather than be frightened away from action by the threat of invasion of their 
privacy).  
 137. See, e.g., Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1995). 
“[E]motional distress” is not synonymous with the term “mental injury” as used by the Supreme 
Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder for purposes of ordering a mental examination of a party under 
Rule 35(a), and [this court] specifically disagrees with those few cases holding that a claim for 
damages for emotional distress, without more, is sufficient to put mental condition “in 
controversy” within the meaning of the Rule. If this were the law, then mental examinations could 
be ordered whenever a plaintiff claimed emotional distress or mental anguish. Rule 35(a) was not 
meant to be applied in so broad a fashion.  
Id. 
 138. Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 164 F.R.D. 204, 211 (N.D. Tex. 1996).  
[A] sexual harassment claimant does not, by virtue of the nature of the claim itself, put her 
emotional state in controversy. That she alleges damages for emotional distress associated with 
working in a hostile environment does not of itself warrant a Rule 35(a) examination. Like the 
personal injury claimant who sues to recover damages for mental anguish associated with an 
injury, a Title VII claimant may seek compensatory damages for emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.  
Id. 
 139. Bridges, 850 F. Supp. at 222. Most cases where Rule 35(a) mental exams have been 
compelled have involved a separate tort claim for emotional distress or an allegation of severe ongoing 
mental injury. Id. 
 140. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 141. Id. at 69. “[I]t does not follow that a complainant’s sexually provocative speech or dress is 
irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances 
unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant.” Id. 
 142. The relevant portion of the amended FED. R. EVID. 412 follows: 
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rule to civil actions to protect the privacy interests of sexual harassment 
plaintiffs.143 The intention of Rule 412 is “to safeguard the alleged victim 
against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual 
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual 
details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process.”144 
This protection is designed to encourage victims to come forward with sexual 
harassment claims by eliminating the threat of invasion of privacy,145 similar 
to the intended purpose behind the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
Courts disagree as to whether plaintiffs claiming emotional distress under 
Title VII waive their psychotherapist-patient privilege and, therefore, must 
disclose their mental health records.146 There are multiple factors supporting 
both protection of a sexual harassment plaintiff’s mental health records and 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
A. Policy, Privacy, and Parallel Provisions: Reasons Advocating for the 
Preservation of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
When addressing a defendant’s request for discovery of a sexual 
harassment plaintiff’s mental health record, courts should strive to preserve 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.147  
 
 
Rule 412. Sex Offense Cases: Relevance of Alleged Victim’s Past Sexual Behavior or Alleged 
Sexual Predisposition. 
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or 
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) 
and (c):  
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. 
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual predisposition. 
(b) Exceptions... 
 . . .  
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any 
alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value 
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. 
Evidence of an alleged victim’s reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy 
by the alleged victim. 
 143. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee notes to the 1994 Amendments. 
 144. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee notes. 
 145. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee notes. By protecting victims of sexual harassment 
from invasion of their privacy, the Rule encourages the victims to institute legal actions against the 
alleged harassers. Id. 
 146. See supra Part IV.B.3, comparing three Title VII court decisions that found waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege and one court decision that found that the privilege remained intact. 
 147. For a complete discussion of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see supra Part 
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1. Title VII Created a Civil Rights Action Rather than a Tort Claim 
Treating a claim for emotional damages under the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 as a tort claim is logical. The 1991 Act appears to have created a tort 
action out of Title VII by allowing recovery of damages for proven mental 
anguish and suffering.148 For a tort action, founded on proving causation of 
mental anguish, disclosure of a sexual harassment plaintiff’s mental health 
records would appear necessary to establish the claim. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, despite its tort-like damages provision, did 
not create a private remedy under Title VII. Title VII, as it always has been, 
is a civil rights action. Title VII’s ultimate goal remains the empowerment of 
victims of discrimination to act as “private attorneys general”149 to enforce 
antidiscrimination law in the workplace. The damages provision in the 1991 
amendment serves as an additional incentive for victims of sexual 
harassment to pursue a civil rights action against an employer.150 
Title VII was created, in part, due to the recognition that sexual 
harassment injures the victim.151 Amending Title VII to allow claims of 
humiliation, emotional distress, and mental anguish further establishes the 
link between discrimination and actual injury of the victim.152 Rather than 
invading a sexual harassment plaintiff’s mental health records to discover 
mental distress, courts can find evidence by looking to the hostile work 
environment itself or listening to the plaintiff’s testimony on how the 
discriminatory conduct affected her well-being. For a successful Title VII 
action, a plaintiff must prove that her mental injuries resulted from a hostile 
work environment.153 Congress intended for courts to focus on the hostile 
 
 
III.B. 
 148. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S513,639 (daily ed. June 6, 1991) (statement of Senator Bob Dole) 
(claiming that the 1991 amendment to the Civil Rights Act “transform[s] Title VII into a national tort 
law”). 
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603. 
 150. Id. at 66-69, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 604-07 (citing testimony of sexual 
harassment victims that although the original intention of Title VII was to make victims of 
discrimination “whole”, usually “Title VII leaves prevailing plaintiffs without remedies for their 
injuries and allows employers who discriminate to avoid any meaningful liability”). Id. 
 151. Id. at 64-65, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 602-03 (“Monetary damages . . . are also necessary 
to make discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and 
emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity.”). 
 152. Id. at 65-66, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 602, 603-04. “Victims of intentional 
discrimination often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering, psychological harm and related 
medical problems, which in turn cause victims of discrimination to suffer substantial out-of-pocket 
medical expenses and other economic losses as a result of the discrimination.” Id. at 65, reprinted in 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 604. 
 153. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 210-11 (“Like the personal injury claimant who sues to recover damages 
for mental anguish associated with an injury, a Title VII claimant may seek compensatory damages for 
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work environment rather than to invade the victim’s privacy and mental 
health history to determine whether she sustained mental injury.154 
2. Privacy Interests of the Sexual Harassment Plaintiff 
Bringing a sexual harassment claim under Title VII, without additional 
tort claims or introduction of privileged communications, should not permit 
the invasion of a victim’s privacy by opening her privileged mental health 
records. The Supreme Court established the federal privilege to create trust in 
confidential therapeutic relationships without fear of disclosure.155 Although 
the Court noted possible waiver of the privilege, the extreme situation used 
as an example implies that a simple claim of emotional distress would not 
warrant such a waiver.156 Protection of the sexual harassment plaintiff’s 
privacy and potential for healing, while still permitting the plaintiff to bring 
an action against the alleged harasser, necessitates the application of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege in Title VII claims. Without the protection 
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, individuals who seek therapy will be 
reluctant to bring suit or will not bring suit at all for legitimate claims of 
harassment out of fear that their mental health will be placed on trial. If 
courts determine that a victim waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege is 
waived when she bringing a civil rights action, then fewer victims will act as 
“private attorneys general”157 for fear of invasion of privacy. 
3. Comparable Federal Rules Exist That Aim To Protect the Sexual 
Harassment Plaintiff 
Similar to the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, other federal rules 
exist to protect a sexual harassment plaintiff from undue invasion into her 
 
 
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.”). Id. at 211. 
 154. “[I]t is not accurate to say that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case has 
‘introduced’ her mental ‘condition’ into the litigation by alleging emotional distress. It is more 
accurate to say that the defendant introduced it by discriminating against the plaintiff.” David A. 
Robinson, Discovery of the Plaintiff’s Mental Health History in an Employment Discrimination Case, 
16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 67 (1994). 
 155. Jaffee, 158 U.S. at 10. 
 156. One court stated the following: 
It is evident from the comment that the privilege is not to be readily waived. The Jaffee court 
describes an extreme situation under which harm to the patient or others is likely to occur if the 
confidential communication is not revealed. Such a situation presents far more compelling 
circumstances than exist in the present case . . . . The Jaffee court clearly did not intend that this 
important privilege be waived or such a purpose. 
Fritsch, 187 F.R.D. at 630-31. 
 157. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603. 
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mental and personal history. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 allows 
mental examinations of litigants when mental health is placed “in 
controversy” and the opposing party shows “good cause” for the order.158 
Courts have determined that Title VII claims do not satisfy the requisite 
“mental health in controversy” requirement and, therefore, do not order 
mental examinations of sexual harassment plaintiffs.159 Similarly, prying into 
the contents of a plaintiff’s mental health records is not necessary because a 
Title VII claim does not place mental state at issue. Instead, testimony of the 
plaintiff160 and analysis of the hostile work environment are enough to 
determine whether the sexual harassment plaintiff experienced mental 
anguish. Mental health records, like Rule 35 mental examinations, open too 
many avenues into the plaintiff’s psyche that are not relevant or necessary in 
calculating damages for the suffering of a Title VII plaintiff.161  
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 protects the privacy of a sexual harassment 
plaintiff from disclosure of her sexual history in civil rights actions.162 Courts 
recognize that the sexual behavior and sexual predisposition of a sexual 
harassment plaintiff are irrelevant and sometimes prejudicial in Title VII 
actions.163 Similarly, mental health records often contain personal and private 
information wholly irrelevant to the civil rights claim. Waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege can expose the sexual harassment victim to 
a piece-by-piece analysis of her life. Not only is this damaging to the 
plaintiff, but also, like evidence of prior sexual history, it can be prejudicial 
to her claim of mental suffering.164 
B. When Should Courts Find Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient 
Privilege?: The Defendant’s Need and Additional Tort-Based Claims  
When analyzing a sexual harassment plaintiff’s request for protection of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, courts should look to the evidentiary 
need of the defendant and the additional claims brought by the plaintiff. 
 
 
 158. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a).  
 159. See supra Part IV.A. 
 160. The question remains whether a sexual harassment plaintiff would rather have her mental 
health records examined or consent to a Rule 35 mental examination. See Fritsch, 187 F.R.D. at 632 
(“Many, if not most, people would undoubtedly prefer to submit to a mental examination, in which 
they have a degree of control over what information is revealed, than to have the records of their past 
psychotherapy sessions disclosed to their adversaries in litigation.”). 
 161. See supra Part IV.A. 
 162. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 163. See supra Part IV.B. 
 164. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee notes. 
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1. Emotional Distress Information Necessary for a Good Defense  
Because the plaintiff in a civil rights action is alleging that the defendant’s 
conduct has caused her emotional distress, the defendant will seek to prove 
the contrary. The defendant will want to establish that the victim either 
suffered no mental anguish due to the hostile work environment, or that the 
plaintiff suffered from serious mental health problems prior to the sexual 
misconduct.165 Reliance on the contents of a sexual harassment plaintiff’s 
mental health records will help to establish the defendant’s case, and, 
therefore, the defense will ask the court for waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.166 Although courts should not easily acquiesce to waiver of 
the privilege, courts should not seal off a defendant’s access to the mental 
health records of the sexual harassment plaintiff. Fairness requires that when 
a plaintiff introduces portions of her mental health records or provides 
testimony of her treating psychotherapist to establish her emotional distress, 
she implicates the psychotherapist-patient privilege and must allow the 
defense access to those privileged communications.  
2. Additional Tort-Based Claims Require Additional Evidence 
It might be appropriate for courts to allow waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege when a sexual harassment plaintiff is claiming more than a 
Title VII violation. If the victim, in addition to the Title VII claim, brings a 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or another tort-based 
action, then it might be permissible to explore mental health records.167 In 
these instances, the plaintiff is asserting extreme mental anguish in addition 
to the distress caused by the hostile work environment. A court’s waiver of 
 
 
 165. Robinson, supra note 154, at 68. 
The “catch” is that on the one hand, if the plaintiff did not seek therapy during the time the 
discrimination was allegedly causing her emotional distress, or if she sought therapy for reasons 
having nothing to do with the job-related distress, the defendant will argue that the plaintiff must 
not have been bothered too much by the discrimination. On the other hand, if the plaintiff was 
already in therapy at the time the discrimination occurred, or even if she sought therapy as a result 
of the discrimination, she must have told her therapist about all kinds of other problems in her life, 
and the defendant will argue that these problems indicate pre-existing emotional instability. 
Id. 
 166. See Vinson, 740 P.2d at 409 (“[B]y asserting a causal link between her mental distress and 
the defendants’ conduct, plaintiff implicitly claims it was not caused by a preexisting mental condition, 
thereby raising the question of alternative sources for the distress.”). 
 167. See Covell, 863 F. Supp. at 206 (holding that when the plaintiff withdrew an additional claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the psychotherapist-patient privilege would no longer be 
waived and the defendant could not access mental health records not relevant to the litigated matter of 
emotional distress caused by a hostile work environment). 
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the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not compromise the purpose of 
Title VII as a civil rights remedy when an additional tort claim is attached.168 
The tort action creates a need to analyze more than the hostile work 
environment, which implies a deeper investigation of the plaintiff’s mental 
condition. 
C. A New Proposed Standard: Balancing the Plaintiff’s Interests and the 
Value of the Mental Health Records 
In determining whether waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is 
appropriate, courts should balance the sexual harassment plaintiff’s interest 
in privacy with the value of the mental health records to the defendant. When 
balancing these two interests, courts should use judicial restraint to protect 
the privilege and the sexual harassment plaintiff from undue invasion of her 
privacy.  
Courts should begin their analysis by remembering the intent of the 
legislature that adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the value the 
Supreme Court has placed upon the confidential relationship between 
psychotherapist and patient. Courts should use restraint in determining that a 
Title VII cause of action has moved beyond a civil rights claim to mandate 
waiver of the privilege. Courts should protect the sexual harassment plaintiff 
and her privacy when she acts as a “private attorney general,”169 as Congress 
intended. 
The importance a court allocates the psychotherapist-patient privilege can 
be mitigated by the type of claim the sexual harassment plaintiff has brought. 
Occasionally a sexual harassment plaintiff will bring a tort-based claim in 
addition to her civil rights action. The tort cause of action will often be for a 
physical or mental injury sustained because of the sexual harassment. In each 
of these instances, the plaintiff is moving beyond the civil rights claim 
towards an injury-based claim. To prove her tort injury, the sexual 
harassment plaintiff will need additional evidence beyond the hostile work 
environment that an injury occurred. This injury, in addition to the sexual 
harassment, places the plaintiff’s mental state at issue so as to waive the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  
Another factor courts may use in finding waiver of the privilege is 
 
 
 168. “Simply put, where a plaintiff merely alleges ‘garden variety’ emotional distress and neither 
alleges a separate tort for the distress, any psychiatric injury or disorder, or unusually severe distress, 
that plaintiff has not placed his/her mental condition at issue to justify a waiver of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege.” Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 285 n.8 (D.N.J. 2000). 
 169. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(J), at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603. 
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whether the waiver is necessary to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of 
information important to the defense. To make this determination, courts 
should consider whether the plaintiff has placed the communication itself at 
issue. If the mental health records have been placed into evidence, or the 
plaintiff’s psychotherapist testifies at trial, then the value to the defendant of 
the mental health records necessitates waiver. In addition, courts should 
consider the remoteness of events found in the mental health records. The 
defendant should not be permitted to engage in a fishing expedition into the 
history of the sexual harassment plaintiff in search of some defense to the 
claim of emotional distress.170 Courts should weigh the plaintiff’s need for 
privacy against the defendant’s need for discovery when determining 
whether mental health records will be discoverable. If courts order the 
examination of a plaintiff’s mental health records, the request should be 
narrowly tailored to fit the time period during and after the harassment in 
question. Any more intrusion would harm the very purpose behind the 
creation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in protecting the private 
individual and the public good.171  
Consider how Anita, a hypothetical sexual harassment plaintiff, and her 
mental health records will be protected by this proposed balancing standard. 
Anita’s male supervisor constantly comments on her body, makes dirty 
jokes, and refers to pornography, leers at her when she passes by, and alludes 
to sexual fantasies he has about her. Although Anita complains to 
management, the harassment continues and even escalates, and Anita is 
forced to resign rather than endure the harassment. Anita sues her employer 
for sexual harassment under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Because her civil 
rights claim alleges emotional distress due to discrimination, Anita will be 
asked through interrogatories or at her deposition whether she has undergone 
psychotherapy. She will answer yes. Defense counsel will then attempt to 
depose her psychotherapist and to obtain her mental health records. In 
determining whether to permit discovery of Anita’s mental health records, 
the court should first focus on the type of claim Anita has brought against her 
employer. In this example, Anita is only bringing a claim under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, unaccompanied by claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress or physical injury. The court should then determine 
 
 
 170. Bridges, 850 F. Supp. at 223 (“[T]the scope of the inquiry must be limited to whether, and to 
what extent, the alleged harassment caused plaintiffs to suffer emotional harm.”). 
 171. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12 (“In contrast to the significant public and private interests 
supporting recognition of the privilege, the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial 
of the privilege is modest. If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between 
psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the 
circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation.”).  
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whether Anita plans to introduce her psychotherapy records into evidence. 
Here, we will conclude that Anita’s sexual harassment claim will not include 
testimony by her treating psychotherapist or evidence from her mental health 
records, only evidence of the hostile work environment itself. Because 
Anita’s civil rights action against her employer does not allege extreme 
mental anguish and does not rely upon evidence found in her mental health 
records, the court should find that she has not waived her psychotherapist-
patient privilege and should protect Anita from her employer’s undue 
invasion into her privacy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By restricting the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Title 
VII sexual harassment claims, courts can further the congressional intent 
behind the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to eradicate workplace discrimination 
against women. More victims of sexual harassment will be willing to bring 
claims against their harassers with the knowledge that their private mental 
health records will remain unexamined. 
Beth S. Frank* 
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